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The life insurance market in France, which has captured EUR 1.5 trillion in savings, is now facing major 
challenges. While households that invest in this savings product mostly have very long‑term investment 
horizons, insurance companies mainly invest in short‑term, liquid and low‑risk assets. This is a disaster 
for the dynamism and prosperity of our country. In this article, the author shows that this situation results 
from poorly designed tax and prudential rules in the insurance sector. Despite its drawbacks, Solvency II 
should solve part of the problem. Yet there remains the issue of the necessary reform of savings taxation 
in France.
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T he recent macro‑financial crisis was an extreme event which constituted a crucial test worldwide for funded pension systems 
often managed by provident institutions and 
insurance companies. Unlike the banking sector, 
which required massive government intervention 
to be bailed out, the insurance sector weathered 
the crisis largely without a hitch.1 This meaningful 
result should nonetheless not make us lose sight of 
the major macroeconomic and financial challenges 
that the life insurance sector will have to rise up to 
in the coming years, in particular in France.
In many countries, households are encouraged by the 
tax system to start building up individual savings for 
their old age as soon as they enter the labour market. 
The United States set up such a system, the famous 
401k plans, in 1980. In this type of system, financial 
risks are entirely borne by households, which could 
have to considerably review their plan in the event of 
a financial crash, i.e. push back their age of retirement 
or lower their living standards. Indeed, before the 
crisis a large number of households had invested 
their lifetime’s savings in shares. For example, 28% 
of US academics of over 55 affiliated to the very 
renowned TIAA‑CREF pension fund had invested 
their entire savings in shares before the crisis.
The French, for their part, have invested massively 
in euro‑denominated life insurance over the 
past twenty years, as shown by the developments 
in outstandings since  1992  (see  Chart  1). Unlike 
unit‑linked life insurance  (which accounts for 
only 15% of outstandings), this system has the great 
advantage of creating a certain degree of solidarity 
between generations of savers, at least in theory. In the 
good years, insurers build up surpluses by offering 
lower returns to savers than those of their portfolio. 
This enables them to draw on this reserve during the 
bad years to offer higher returns than those of their 
portfolio. It is to their credit that insurance companies 
had taken the risk of conducting their mission efficiently 
by accumulating reserves amounting to approximately 
10% of the value of their assets, i.e. roughly 2.5 times 
more than the minimum required by prudential 
regulations. So thanks to the withdrawals from these 
large reserves, life insurance returns have been higher 
than those of sovereign bonds in recent years. Indeed, 
as shown in Chart 2, insurers continue to offer the 
historical yields of the bonds that they purchased 
ten and twenty years ago with the money invested 
by previous generations of policyholders.
This solidarity between generations of savers is the 
raison d’être of life insurers. It allows risk‑sharing 
between generations of policyholders, and thus 
creates value. Gollier (2008) shows that this solidarity 
could improve households’ welfare as much as 
would a 1% increase in the annual return on their 
savings. However, it is impossible to organise such 
1 AIG is obviously an exception. Note that the activities of AIG that led to its resounding rescue in September 2008 were its banking activities.
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an intergenerational solidarity without public 
intervention. This requires setting up a special tax 
system, in order to reduce the opportunistic behaviour 
of savers, otherwise tempted to go in and out of life 
insurance depending on whether the returns offered 
are higher or lower than those of direct asset holdings. 
This risk is real, since funds are blocked for a limited 
period of eight years to obtain the full tax advantage. 
Since 2009, the competition between life insurance 
and the Livret A passbook illustrates the volatility 
that insurers are confronted with.
The logical counterpart of the high liquidity of 
life insurance in France is an investment strategy 
whereby life insurers invest the EUR 1.5  trillion 
held on their balance sheet in safe and liquid assets. 
This asset‑liability matching is reinforced by two crucial 
features. The first concerns the rate guarantee, which 
has gradually been reduced from 4.5% to 0% over 
the past two decades. The second is the so‑called 
“ratchet effect”, which each year offers policyholders 
the full and entire ownership of the returns recorded 
in the past. For a long time, poor regulation of the 
sector’s solvency  enabled policyholders to have 
the best of both worlds, i.e. enjoy liquid, safe and 
profitable savings products thanks to investments in 
relatively high‑risk assets. This was made possible 
through two complementary mechanisms, an implicit 
government insurance against the risk of default of 
insurance companies and free portfolio insurance 
generated by the rate guarantee. The much tighter 
capital requirements imposed by Solvency II will 
logically force policyholders to eventually choose 
between safety and profitability. By reducing the moral 
hazard generated by the implicit government insurance 
against default risk, they will lead to an increase in 
the cost of capital for life insurers holding a large 
amount of non‑hedged high‑risk assets. The market 
will therefore have to choose between liquidity, 
safety and profitability. In the short run, long‑term 
profitability has been sacrificed, since insurers have 
drastically cut back the share of their reserves invested 
in equities and real estate in recent years. In this 
article, I develop the idea that this development is 
incompatible with the public interest, not only from 
the point of view of savers but also in terms of our 
economy’s dynamism. Economic efficiency suggests 
another route: that of a market shift towards long‑term 
savings products where financial risk is more evenly 
shared between the parties involved. This should lead 
to a greater investment of life insurance outstandings 
in the financing of our economy.
A few theoreticAl points  
on long‑term sAvings
1| Asset allocation and savings horizon
In an economy with no savings and no investment 
as described by Lucas (1978), each year households 
consume their year’s income. In such an economy, 
consumption is highly volatile and households bear 
significant risks that reduce their welfare. Their 
appetite to take additional risks is limited. Saving 
during the good years and spending those savings 
during the lean years is a very useful way of managing 
risks by smoothing out any shocks. Not only do these 
precautionary savings raise households’ welfare, 
but they also increase their risk tolerance. This is 
especially true for the youngest households which 
have a greater number of  years before them to 
smooth out temporary shocks to their income using 
this strategy of building up and drawing on these 
long‑term savings.
Savers with a long‑term investment horizon and 
a sufficiently large amount of liquid savings are 
thus in a position to diversify their risk over time. 
Epstein  (1983), Gollier  (2001,  2002) and Gollier 
and Zeckhauser (2002) have shown that this ability 
to manage risks over time massively increases the 
risk tolerance of those households that can afford 
to take on such risk. This justifies that households 
invest a much larger share of their wealth in high‑risk 
assets such as equities to take advantage of the risk 
premium associated with these asset classes. In other 
words, long‑term savings should naturally be steered 
towards the financing of long‑term and high‑risk 
investments. It is therefore absurd that in France the 
EUR 1.5 trillion in life insurance savings are primarily 
invested in bonds, especially in the current context 
of historically low interest rates. In other countries, 
such as the  United  States, the Netherlands and 
Great Britain, the long‑term savings of funded pension 
schemes are invested more heavily in high‑risk assets.
In general equilibrium, this loss of interest in 
long‑term and high‑risk assets leads to excessive 
risk premiums for these asset classes. This increases 
the cost of capital for the companies that carry these 
investments, which constrains their competitiveness, 
employment and growth. It makes the economy too 
short‑termist.
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2| Intergenerational risk‑sharing 
and collective tolerance to risk
Life is unfortunately too short for human beings to 
fully benefit from the effects of intertemporal risk 
diversification. Their investment horizon rarely 
exceeds forty years. Now the fate of households 
with a portfolio of securities held over a period 
of twenty years is very heterogeneous, depending on 
the generation of investors to which they belong: in 
the United States, 1 dollar invested in a diversified 
equity portfolio in early 1949 generated 10.8 dollars in 
accumulated capital at end‑1968, but only 1.2 dollars 
over the period 1901‑1920. At present, there is no 
market mechanism that allows one generation of 
savers to actually share risks with the following 
generations. This market incompleteness does 
therefore not enable an efficient allocation of risk 
between generations. This absence of an effective 
market based on intergenerational risk‑sharing 
poses a real problem both in terms of social equity 
and of financial risk expectations.
Economic efficiency, as well as equity, call for 
public intervention with the objective of setting up 
a risk‑sharing framework between generations of 
investors. Public long‑term institutional investors 
and collective pension funds are well suited to carry 
out this task alongside governments, whose time 
horizon is infinite and which take into account 
the welfare of future generations. By acting as 
the representatives of the different generations 
of citizens, these financial intermediaries may 
accumulate financial reserves over long periods of 
time to ensure a better social redistribution of welfare 
through their investments, in particular during hard 
times, by smoothing out financial shocks over time 
and across generations. This mechanism improves 
the welfare of all generations, at least ex ante. It has 
been shown (Gollier, 2008) that this effect on welfare 
amounts, in the economy, to a 1% increase in the 
return on capital, in particular thanks to a decrease 
in collective risk aversion brought about by this 
intergenerational risk diversification.
Defined‑contribution pension funds have broadly 
succeeded in setting  up this intergenerational 
solidarity in Anglo‑Saxon countries thanks to the 
illiquidity of long‑term savings and the significant 
tax incentives incorporated into this system in 
these countries. Can the same be said about life 
insurance in France? Of course not and this for 
four reasons:
• this savings product is too liquid;
• the tax advantage disappears completely after only 
eight years;
• future returns are guaranteed;
• policyholders have the full and entire ownership 
of past returns (ratchet effect).
Each one of these four characteristics of French 
life insurance is incompatible with intertemporal 
and intergenerational risk‑sharing. It leads life 
insurance companies to invest the sums collected 
in short‑term, safe and liquid assets, which goes 
against the conclusions of section 1. This is a social 
and financial disaster for France.
The existential test of the French life insurance 
system will take place the day interest rates in the 
euro area start to rise, in particular if they increase 
rapidly. In such a scenario, insurers will end up with 
a considerable stock of bonds showing an unrealised 
loss just when policyholders will be drawn to interest 
rate assets offered on the market with much more 
attractive returns than today. To put it plainly, the 
opposite phenomenon of that observed for the 
past twenty five years will occur. Over this period, 
the fall in interest rates has offered new clients the 
historically high returns of the bonds purchased for 
the long‑standing clients captured by the tax break. 
This so‑called dilution phenomenon, a corollary of 
the intergenerational diversification described above, 
has led to the extraordinary success of life insurance, 
which has transferred wealth from the older 
generations of savers to the new ones. When interest 
rates eventually start to rise, a reverse transfer 
should be organised: new clients should accept lower 
expected life insurance returns than interest rates, 
since the high rate bonds purchased with their savings 
shall be diluted with the low rate bonds currently 
purchased by insurers on the market. In this inevitable 
scenario, this dilution clearly does not make this 
savings product very attractive for potential new 
policyholders, which are expected to turn to other 
products. Moreover, even if a certain degree of inertia 
is to be expected, the long‑standing policyholders 
should also ask themselves questions, and potentially 
exercise their exit option if the tax advantage that they 
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would lose in the process is insufficient. In such a 
situation, the life insurance market could well be in a 
critical situation. This insurance crisis would in some 
way only be the counterpart of the very low interest 
rate policy implemented since 2007 to rescue the 
banking system. It would also demonstrate the failure 
of the intergenerational risk‑sharing that this market 
has attempted to set up for the past four decades 
thanks to the tax advantage for savers who agree to 
freeze their savings for more than eight years. This 
scenario also raises the issue of the need to review 
the tax system governing life insurance in France, 
should there exist in this country a political will to 
establish a long‑term collective savings system based 
on intergenerational solidarity.
3| Mean reversion and long‑term risks2
What matters for long‑term investors and their 
discretionary clients is the uncertainty about the 
flow of asset returns, which should cover liabilities 
over the long run. Consequently, it makes economic 
sense for them to adjust in their allocation model 
the risk premiums attached to the different financial 
instruments according to the length of the different 
liabilities. For example, if investments are made to 
cover a ten year liability, the problem is measuring the 
risk of these investments not covering this ten year 
liability. In other words, it is all about assessing the 
volatility of this asset’s performance over ten years. 
Note also that the performance of this asset is to be 
compared not with the short‑term risk‑free rate but 
with the performance of ten year sovereign bonds.
Given the complexity of statistical relationships as 
regards the dynamics of asset class performances, it 
is generally not easy to switch from an assessment of 
the traditional annual volatility of these assets to that 
of a ten year volatility. The easiest case consists in 
assuming that equity returns are not correlated over 
time, i.e. past returns do not predict future returns. 
In this case, a negative correlation of returns over 
time lowers the aggregate risk by raising the holding 
period. Let us briefly summarise the state of our 
knowledge on this subject. In the short run, shares 
are riskier than bonds. As an illustration, over the 
period from 1890 to 1998 in the United States, the 
volatility of annual equity returns was 18%, while 
that of bonds was only 6.5%. In the absence of any 
serial correlation of asset returns, the volatility of 
the annual return of the different asset classes is a 
good measure of risk irrespective of the length of the 
investment. However, it has now been acknowledged 
that the returns of most financial assets do not follow 
a random walk. For example, certain studies (see 
Fama and French, 1988 and Bansal and Yaron, 2004) 
show that equity returns tend to revert to the mean, 
i.e. they are negatively autocorrelated. Although 
shares display a slight positive autocorrelation at high 
frequency (a few days), what matters for long‑term 
investors is the existence of six to ten‑year cycles. 
Consequently, investors with long‑term liabilities 
are in a position to better diversify their equity risk 
over time. 
The existence of a positive serial correlation of 
bond yields and a negative serial correlation of 
equity returns means that the relative equity 
versus bond risk decreases with the time horizon 
of the investment. Campbell and Viceira  (2002) 
estimate a vector autoregressive model over the 
period 1953‑1999 to describe the US yield processes. 
They use as predictive variables the price‑earnings 
ratio, the short‑term/long‑term rate spread and 
the nominal interest rate. The main results are 
presented in Chart 3. In this chart, the volatility 
of annualised investment yields over k quarters is 
2 This text updates a section published in Gollier and Janci (2010).
Chart 3
Volatility of financial asset returns in the United States
Quarterly data 1953Q2‑1999Q4
(x axis: holding period, k, in quarters,  
y axis: annualised standard deviation of k – period return)
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shown according to k, for shares, Treasury bills and 
bonds respectively. It is striking that the relative 
risk of holding shares decreases rapidly for holding 
periods of between 1 and 20 years, while the risk 
of holding long‑term bonds increases sharply for 
holding periods of between 1 and 5 years. For time 
horizons between 20 and 50 years, the volatilities of 
aggregate returns on shares and long‑term bonds are 
close. Bec and Gollier (2008) obtain similar, albeit 
less marked, results using French data.
From this we can draw the lesson that thanks to 
the smoothing of shocks on asset returns, and also 
potentially thanks to the temporal diversification 
of equity risk, savers with a long‑term investment 
horizon may benefit from a more favourable 
risk‑performance relationship than short‑term 
investors. From the perspective of optimising the 
common good, this reinforces the results of section 1 
which favour a portfolio strategy focused on assets 
that appear risky over a short‑term horizon.
4| Who should benefit  
from a portfolio insurance?
Non‑unit linked life insurance in France offers a 
guarantee of non‑negative returns. This portfolio 
insurance is a surprising element for such a popular 
long‑term savings product despite a rather skewed 
distribution in favour of higher‑income households. 
It may be useful to recall a simple truth: if saver A 
has an insurance against non‑diversifiable risk, this 
means that agent B has agreed to sell it to him. 
In other words, it is physically impossible to insure 
100% of economic agents: macroeconomic risk is 
collectively uninsurable and must ultimately be 
borne by savers. Obviously, this portfolio insurance 
is intrinsically very attractive since it guarantees 
an income in situations where the community 
has become impoverished. If one recalls, like 
Barro (2006, 2009), that the risk premium on financial 
markets may be explained by a collective belief that 
GDP could collapse by roughly 40% with an annual 
probability of 1.7%, then the value given by savers 
to this portfolio insurance is easily understandable. 
However, symmetrically, economic agents who 
provide the counterpart on this portfolio insurance 
market should insist on a substantial premium.
My hypothesis is that the life insurance market 
in France has malfunctioned in this area. The market has 
offered this portfolio insurance on the EUR 1.2 trillion 
outstanding amount without policyholders actually 
having to pay the cost. This hypothesis is based on the 
now well‑known phenomenon of moral hazard: in the 
event of a macroeconomic disaster, the rate guarantee 
would bankrupt most insurers, forcing governments 
to bail them out in line with the “too‑big‑to‑fail” belief 
that prevailed in the banking sector in 2008. Insurers 
are therefore not encouraged to value this risk that 
they do not cover themselves3 and policyholders have 
an incentive to purchase euro‑denominated policies 
containing this “free” insurance to the detriment of 
unit‑linked policies which tend to be more profitable 
in the long run.
The Solvency II rules have completely disrupted 
this past balance essentially by forcing insurers to 
keep these extreme risks on their balance sheets. 
This should lead to quite fundamental market 
adjustments in the coming years. The price paid 
by policyholders to maintain this rate guarantee 
should increase. This should encourage them to 
switch from euro‑denominated policies to unit‑linked 
policies, which would meet the general interest as 
explained above. Curiously, this is not what is actually 
happening. The market has reacted to the new rules 
by continuing to strongly focus on offering guaranteed 
rate products, while reducing equity investments.4 
This is illustrated by the announced failure of the 
new “euro‑croissance” policies, which are still far from 
being optimal: although they remove the ratchet 
effect, they maintain the rate guarantee at maturity. 
This leads me to formulate a second hypothesis: 
the market has not yet priced portfolio insurance 
at its real value, which has not encouraged savers 
to rebalance their savings. Indeed, the Solvency II 
rules shall not be fully operational for several years.
3 This reminds us that life insurance products with a rate guarantee and variable annuities are of a systemic nature if their portfolio insurance component is not 
covered by matching assets (Bobtcheff, Chaney and Gollier, 2014).
4 According to the 2014 Annual Report of the Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance, the investment share of life, capitalisation and mixed insurance 
companies in shares and mutual funds dropped from 29% in 2007 to 21% in 2013.  
http://www.ffsa.fr/sites/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014‑07/ffsa_ra_2013_9‑07_light.pdf 
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This failure contributes to maintaining a strong 
banking intermediation in our country, at a time 
when this sector is restricting its financing to the 
economy for different reasons. In the United States, 
80% of companies’ financing needs are covered by 
the market and 20% by banks; in France it is the 
opposite. The absence of long‑term savings invested 
in high‑risk financial assets in Europe partly explains 
this strong disabling asymmetry.
conclusion And future outlook
French life insurance is at a crossroads. After 
two decades of extraordinary growth, this 
popular long‑term savings product is no longer 
able to meet the requirements of a dynamic 
economy. Given that the leading product  (the 
euro‑denominated policy) is excessively liquid, 
it is structurally incapable of organising an 
intergenerational solidarity close to that which 
can be found in defined contribution pension 
schemes in Anglo‑Saxon countries and which has 
contributed to the latter’s economic dynamism 
and prosperity. It is also structurally incapable 
of steering households’ long‑term savings into 
the long‑term investment opportunities of our 
economy, thereby resulting in excessively high 
risk premiums and under‑investment in projects 
that foster long‑term growth.
Even though they are not perfect (the length of insurance 
liabilities and the mean reversion of asset returns are 
not properly taken into account, for example), the new 
Solvency II rules should in the coming years lead to 
major changes in the life insurance sector in France 
conducive to less short‑termism and greater risk‑taking. 
Given that the liquidity of life insurance products shall 
now be more costly in the framework of the sector’s 
new Solvency rules, this excess liquidity of long‑term 
savings products in France should decrease. In the 
future, savers will have to arbitrate between conflicting 
objectives of liquidity, rate guarantee and profitability. 
This is the price to pay to prevent government and 
taxpayers from having to bear the sector’s financial 
losses in the event of a massive financial crisis, but, 
from a more positive perspective, it is also the price 
to pay to set up in France a financial system more 
compatible with the public interest.
The fact remains that savings taxation in France is 
problematic. The market is structurally incapable 
of organising an intergenerational diversification 
of financial and macroeconomic risks, such as can 
be found in well‑managed pay‑as‑you‑go pension 
systems and in mandatory defined contribution 
pension schemes. It is only by setting up tax incentives 
that penalise liquid savings and subsidise less liquid 
long‑term savings that the market shall be able to 
offer products that create such an intergenerational 
solidarity, a source of collective welfare. We still have 
a long way to go in France.
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